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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
By AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.*
During 1962 the Colorado Supreme Court decided more than
forty cases' concerned with criminal law and procedure, including
some cases dealing with violations of municipal ordinances. In
addition, the 1962 Colorado Legislature enacted a few statutes
on criminal law and procedure; and the Colorado Supreme Court
in late December of 1962 adopted several amendments to the Colo-
rado Rules of Criminal Procedure, these amendments to be effec-
tive on January 1, 1963. All three types of law-case law, statutory
law and court rules-are covered by this article.
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
A. Municipal Ordinance Violations
The famous Merris case 2 of 1958 contained two important
propositions: (1) The municipal penal ordinance of a home rule
city creates a crime, not a mere civil wrong, if there exists a
counterpart state statute punishing the same conduct or if the
ordinance authorizes imprisonment as punishment.3 (2) When
a state criminal statute punishes conduct of statewide concern,
the home rule city lacks the power to enact a penal ordinance
punishing the same conduct 4 (and conversely, when a home rule
city has enacted a penal ordinance punishing conduct of local
concern, a state statute punishing the same conduct is inappli-
cable to such conduct committed within the municipal territorial
limits).
As to the first proposition, a 1962 case broadens it somewhat..5
"Imposition of criminal sanctions," the court says, "makes them
[municipal violations] crimes."' "Criminal sanctions" is an expres-
sion which would seem to be broad enough to include a fine as
well as imprisonment, so that a muncipal violation for which a
fine is the only authorized punishment may nevertheless be a
crime, to be prosecuted in accordance with the law relating to
criminal procedure for minor offenses.
Two events which occurred in 1961 have brought about a
drastic limitation upon the second of the two propositions. A
1961 case recognized that conduct is not necessarily purely local
or exclusively statewide; that some types of conduct partake of
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas,
spring semester 1963.
1 The cases discussed in this article are found in 368 P.2d through 377 P.2d No. 4.
" Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958), discussed in Scott, Municipal Penal
Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 267 (1958).
3 The penal ordinance of a "statutory" municipality (i.e., one without home rule) is no doubt
also a crime if there is a counterpart state statute or if the ordinance authorizes imprisonment.
4 The power of a "statutory" municipality to enact penal ordinances was later held to be even
more limited than that of a home rule city, in Aurora v. Mitchell, 144 Colo. 526, 357 P.2d 923 (1960),
discussed in Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 38 DICTA 65, 66 (1961).
5 Pueblo v. Clemmer, 375 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1962) (holding that one convicted of a municipal
violation in municipal court on a not-guilty plea, and who involuntarily pays the fine imposed, may
nevertheless thereafter appeal to the county court. The report of the case does not disclose
whether the violation in question was punishable only by fine, or whether imprisonment was
authorized as well.).
6 Id. at 100.
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both qualities; and that with such types the home rule city has
power to enact ordinances if the state has not forbidden the
exercise of this power. 7 A 1961 statutes expressly authorized
Colorado municipalities (both statutory and home rule) to enact
penal ordinances punishing most9 traffic offenses committed within
their municipal borders. As a direct result of these events, the
year 1962 saw a cessation of the sometimes difficult game, played
with gusto in previous years, of pigeon-holing various types of
conduct into the statewide or into the local category. No 1962
case had to deal with the statewide-local distinction.
B. Particular Crimes
1. Murder-Meaning of "Malice."-In one 1962 murder case,",
the trial judge, unfortunately for the cause of justice, took too
literal a view of the word "malice" in the definition of murder. 1
The prosecution's evidence at the trial on a murder charge dis-
closed that the defendant and the victim, who did not know each
other, got into an argument at a bar, during which the defendant,
after threatening the victim with a gun, shot him to death. The
trial court directed a verdict of acquittal of both murder and man-
slaughter on the theory that, since the defendant did not know
the deceased, he could not have had "malice" toward him. The
prosecution obtained a review of the case on writ of error, and
the supreme court quite properly disapproved of the trial court's
error in directing a verdict of acquittal, pointing out that "malice"
in the definition of murder is not to be taken literally.12 It does
not mean hatred, spite or ill-will, for it is clear that one can
murder for love (as in a mercy killing) or for money (as by a
hired killer) as well as for hatred. "Malice" in murder does not
even require an intent to kill, for one can, in Colorado as well as
elsewhere, commit murder by unintentionally killing another
either though highly reckless conduct or in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of some felonies.
2. Murder--"In the Perpetration of."-In another 1962 murder
case, the prosecution's evidence was that the defendant robbed a
cab driver at gunpoint, ordered him to drive down a lonely road
and stop, conversed with him for a few minutes and shot him to
death.13 The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder on
the theory that he had killed the deceased in the perpetration of
the robbery. The defendant contended on writ of error that the
killing did not occur "in the perpetration of" the robbery because
it took place some distance away from, and some time after, the
robbery. The supreme court, however, rejected this argument,
7 Woolverton v. City and County of Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 361 P.2d 982 (1961) (holding that
a home rule city has power to punish gambling), discussed in Scott, One Year Review of Criminal
Law and Procedure, 39 DICTA 81, 82 (1962).
8 Colo. Sess. Lows 1961, ch. 66, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4-6, -7 (1953), discussed in
Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 39 DICTA 81, 82 (1962).
9 The statute expressly excepts three types of traffic offenses from the exercise of municipal
power: (1) driving under the influence, (2) driving an unregistered car or after license revocation
or suspension, and (3) hit-and-run driving.
10 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
11 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-1 (1953) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought, either express or implied .... ").
12 See infra, notes 148-152 and text, for a discussion of the prosecution's right to retry this
defendant after his erroneous acquittal by the trial court.
13 Bizup v. People, 371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962).
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holding that the killing was "so closely connected in point of time,
place and continuity of action" with the robbery as to have been
committed in the perpetration of it. "All of the defendant's acts
from the time he took the money until he cold bloodedly shot his
victim were one continuous integrated attempt to successfully
complete his crime and escape detection.""u This indicates a rela-
tively broad, yet quite proper, view of the scope of those rather
vague words, "in the perpetration of"-an expression which has
been given a narrower interpretation in some jurisdictions.' 5
3. Voluntary Manslaughter.-It may still be the law that an
intentional killing inflicted in a "mutual combat" or "chance med-
ley" constitutes voluntary manslaughter, without regard to the
traditional provocation usually required for this crime. There is
not much modern law on it.' 6 A 1962 Colorado case did not quite
raise the question of the existence of this type of voluntary man-
slaughter, because the defendant killed only after the mutual
combat had ended.17  Having rendered the victim helpless, the
defendant undertook to kick him in the head numerous times
until he died.
4. Larceny by Bailee.-One who receives stolen property inno-
cently (i.e., not knowing it to be stolen), and who later, after
learning of the stolen character of the property, converts the
property to his own use, cannot, of course, be guilty of the
crime of receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen, for the
receiving and the knowledge must coincide; but he is guilty of
larceny by bailee in Colorado."
5. Larceny from the Person.-Under the Colorado larceny
statute, 9 "larceny from the person" (more familiarly known as
"pickpocketing") is a felony, punishable by imprisonment of from
one to ten years in the penitentiary, regardless of the value of
the property stolen.
20
6. Forgery.-A 1962 forgery case involved this fact situation:"
X, with an intent to defraud, signed his true name to a check as
14 Id. at 788.
15 E.g., People v. Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382, 125 N.E. 535, 22 A.L.R. 845 (1919).
16 See Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation, 106 U. Pa.L.Rev. 1021, 1031-32
(1958).
17 Trujillo v. People, 372 P.2d 86 (Colo. 1962).
IS Peters v. People, 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962).
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-2 (6) (1960 Perm, Supp.).
20 People v. McIntosh, 369 P.2d 987 (Colo. 1962) (disapproving trial court's sentence as though
defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor, upon his conviction of larceny from the person
of property worth $26).
21 Gonzales v. People, 369 P.2d 987 (Colo. 1962).
MARSOLEK'S HARDWARE & APPLIANCE STORE
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agent for the Y Co., a real company, when in fact he had no
authority to do so. The supreme court held this to constitute the
crime of forgery.'!' The weight of authority in other jurisdictions,
however, holds this not to be forgery, 2  although a modern trend,
by statute at least, is to make it so.2 4 On principle, it hardly seems
proper to distinguish between (1) signing another's name to a
check with intent to defraud (forgery) and (2) signing one's own
name to a check as agent for another, without authority to act
as his agent, with intent to defraud (not forgery, by the majority
view).
7. Confidence Game.-A 1962 Colorado case2 5 holds, without
discussion, that one commits the crime of confidence game, as
well as the crime of forgery, when he tries to pass what he knows
to be a forged check. Elsewhere in this article the propriety of
convicting him, on account of this single act, of both forgery and
confidence game is discussed.2 6 Now, however, the question of his
liability for the crime of confidence game alone is treated.
From the report of the case, it appears that the defendant, with
some confederates, went to a supermarket, made out a check
payable to a person whose driver's license was in the possession
of a lady confederate, and forged a signature. The lady accom-
plice then unsuccessfully tried to cash the check with the aid of
the driver's license.
One of the difficult areas of Colorado criminal law concerns
the guilt of one who obtains, or attempts to obtain, money or
property by means of a check which "bounces": Is it the short-
check crime (a misdemeanor), or the no-account-check crime (a
five-year maximum felony), or false pretenses (a ten-year felony
if over $50 obtained), or confidence game (a twenty-year felony) ?27
Earlier Colorado cases have required, in addition to the use of
the bad check, the defendant's worming his way into the victim's
confidence..28 Obtaining his confidence through a course of regular
business dealings will not do.2 9 It would seem, for the same
reason, that the one-shot presentation of a bad check (whether
forged, short or no-account to the victim by a stranger will not do.
And yet that is all that appears in the report of the 1962 case
which upheld the confidence game conviction.
8. Miscellaneous Crimes.-One can carry a deadly weapon
concealed upon his person, in violation of the law, though he
carries it as an article of merchandise and has no in'ention to
use it as a weapon. 3 ) But one who possesses a record of be's on
sporting events, together with a copy of the Daily Racing Form
and a clipping from the newspaper showing the results of horse
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-6-1 (1953) (defining forgery of a check simply as "falsely make, alter,
forge, or counterfeit any . . . check .... . ... with no specific reference to false statement of
authority to sign).
23 E.g., Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650 (1962); Perkins, Criminal Low, 297 (1957).
24 See A.L.I. Model Penal Code, 83 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
25 Krantz v. People, 374 P.2d 199 (Colo. 1962).
26 See infra notes 113-116 and text thereto.
27 See Scott. One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure, 36 DICTA 35, 38-39 (1959).
28 E.g., Bevins v. People, 138 Colo. 123, 330 P.2d 709 (1958); see cases cited in Scott, One Year




30 Pueblo v. Sanders, 376 P.2d 996 (Cola 1962) (municipal ordinance forbids one not a police
officer to "carry concealed upon his person any pistol, bowie knife, dagger or other deadly weapon,"
with no specific mention of any required state of mind.
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races run the previous day, does not keep or exhibit any "device




1. Parties: Aid and Abet.-Colorado has an unusual statute
punishing (with a misdemeanor penalty) as an "accessory during
the fact" one "who stands by, without giving such help as he may
[have I in his power to prevent a criminal offense from being
committed.1' 3 2 This passive person is to be distinguished from his
more active counterpart, the aider and abettor-one "who stands
by and aids, abets and assists" and who is subject to the same
punishment as the principal criminal who actually commits the
crime. 13 In a 1962 case, one of Denver's police-burglars of recent
scandalous fame observed a burglary in progress and knew who
the burglars were.3 4 While the burglary continued before his eyes,
he radioed his dispatcher that the building in question had been
burglarized, giving the impression that the crime had ended. The
supreme court held that this conduct, by intentionally misleading
the police, constituted active aid and assistance, making the actor
an aider and abettor in the burglary rather than, as he contended,
a mere accessory during the fact.
2. Self-defense.-The Anglo-American law is quite well settled
that, in order for the defense of self-defense to operate so as to
justify an intentional homicide, the killer must reasonably believe
(though he need not correctly believe) both (1) that his adversary
will, unless prevented, immediately inflict a fatal or serious bodily
injury upon him, and (2) that he must use deadly force against
his adversary in order to prevent him from inflicting such harm.: 5
The Colorado statute on justifiable self-defense, though somewhat
vaguely worded, seems to recognize these principles; 3 6 but a 1960
Colorado case held an instruction to be misleading and confusing
which tells the jury that the right of self-defense in a homicide
case is based upon what a reasonable person would do under
similar circumstances.37 A 1962 case puts Colorado back on the
reasonable-man track, however, approving a given jury instruc-
tion that the defendant is entitled to the defense if it appeared
to him and would have appeared to a reasonable man that he
was in imminent danger of being killed or receiving great bodily
harm; and disapproving a tendered instruction that made the
defendant alone the judge of the danger, without regard to the
reasonableness of his judgment. '
31 People v. Wells, 374 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1962), interpreting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40.10-9 (1953).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-1-12, -13 (1953).
33 Id. at § 40-1-12.
34 Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962).
35 In many jurisdictions, including Colorado, if the killer knows that he can safely escape from
what he reasonably believes to be the deadly attack of his adversary by an ignominous retreat,
he is not obliged to take this escape route, but can properly stand his ground and kill his adversary,
provided he was not the aggressor in beginning the difficulty. E.g., Enyort v. People, 67 Colo. 434,
180 Pac. 722 (1919). See Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 54, 63 (Colo. 1962) (approving instruction
on self-defense including: "He is not required to retreat.") But if the killer, by striking the first
blow, provoked the deadly attack of his adversary, he is obliged to retreat before using deadly
force upon the adversary. See Perkins, Criminal Law 883-909 (1957).
36 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-15 (1953).
37 Vigil v. People, 143 Colo. 328, 353 P.2d 82 (1960), criticized in Scott, One Year Review of
Criminal Low and Procedure, 38 DICTA 65, 67-68 (1961).
3 S Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1962).
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3. Insanity.-Colorado has by statute adopted the right-and-
wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible-impulse test, for the
defense of insanityf 9 Under the latter test, one who knows right
from wrong is nevertheless insane if his mental disease renders
him incapable of choosing the right and refraining from doing the
wrong. One problem with the irresistible-impulse test is: how
irresistible does the impulse have to be? According to psychia-
trists, complete inability to resist is quite rare. Far more common
are urges which are so strong that most persons could not resist
them under most circumstances, but which they could neverthe-
less resist if a policeman were standing by.40 Perhaps one can be
held to have an irresistible impulse even if he would not have
followed through his impulse with a police officer looking on.
One 1962 Colorado case, involving a prosecution for murder,
touched upon the problem but did not decide it.41 A defense psychi-
atrist was asked by the district attorney on cross examination
whether the defendant would have killed the victim if there had
been a policeman at his elbow. The defense made no objection,
and the psychiatrist answered yes. The jury found the defendant
sane and guilty of murder. The supreme court affirmed without
deciding whether the question was proper, i.e., whether one can
be found to have an irrestible impulse which he could have resisted
had there been "a policeman at the elbow."
D. Statutory Changes
The 1962 Colorado legislature discovered a number of criminal
statutes that provided for long terms of imprisonment but which
had failed, apparently through oversight, to state that the imprison-
ment was to be served in the state penitentiary. Under the Colorado
constitution,42 such crimes were misdemeanors, for which sentences
of imprisonment must be served in the county jail.43 Thus, bur-
glary with explosives, calling for imprisonment for a minimum
of twenty-five years and a maximum of forty years,44 was a mere
misdemeanor for which the county jail was the required (though
most unsatisfactory) place of imprisonment. The 1962 legislature
corrected several mistakes of this kind, by providing in each
instance for imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
4
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure: Amendments
The new C r i m i n a 1 R u 1 e s, promulgated by the Colorado
Supreme Court in 1961 and effective on November 1 of that year,
seem to be working quite well in practice.46 Only a few cases
39 Colf. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-1(2) (1953).
40 Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, 84 (1954): "Most exhibitionists, for example,
have enough control not to yield to their impulse in the presence of a policeman."
41 Bizup v. People, 371 P.2d 786 (Colo, 1962).
42 Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 4.
43 Bustamante v. People, 133 Colo. 497, 297 P.2d 538 (1956).
44 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-3-7 (1953).
45 Colo. Sess. Laws 1962, cc. 46-51, 63, amending the statutes on third-degree rape (that in-
teresting species of rape by which a female may be guilty of rape of a male under 18), burglary
with explosives, insurrection, use of public funds for private purposes, sabotage, anarchy, sedition,
disloyalty, and avoiding a writ of habeas corpus. In some of these statutory amendments the
length of imprisonment, in addition to the place of imprisonment, was changed.
46 See 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. No. 1 (1961) for a symposium on the Rules, containing the text
thereof and extensive commentary thereon.
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concerning the Rules reached the supreme court in 1962, no doubt
in good part because of the newness of the Rules.
One difficulty which has existed during 1962, the first year
under the Rules, has been the overlapping of statutes and rules.
Often the old statute (still on the books) provides for substan-
tially the same procedure as the counterpart Rule, but sometimes
(though far less frequently) the two are absolutely inconsistent.'
Overlapping without inconsistency is bad enough, but inconsistency
is much worse. During 1962, the Colorado Bar Association's Crim-
inal Law Committee, which drafted the Rules, undertook to recom-
mend to the Colorado Legislative Council the specific statutes
which should be repealed or amended because of the Rules. The
1963 Legislative Council has recommended to the 1963 Legislature
the adoption of the Committee's suggestions.
48
Meanwhile, the Committee went to work to draft some recom-
mended amendments to the Rules, in order to cure some defects
which had come to light. The recommendations were, for the
most part, adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court, becoming
effective on January 1, 1963. Most of the amendments do not
effect major changes, but three of them may be singled out for
special mention: (1) Amended Rule 44 authorizes (but does not
require) the district and county courts to appoint counsel to
defend indigent defendants at their trials for misdemeanors.4 9
(2) Amended Rule 46 provides for a new and simple procedure
for enforcing the forfeiture of bail. (3) Amended Rule 35 (b)
allows the defendant to have a review, on writ of error, of the
sentencing court's denial of relief under Colorado's new postcon-
viction remedy (specifically, a motion in the sentencing court to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence).;5o This relief is available
to convicted prisoners whose constitutional rights have been vio-
lated under circumstances which precluded correcting the consti-
tutional wrongs by the normal channel of review on writ of error.
B. Pre-Trial Prohibition: Declaratory Judgement
A 1962 Colorado case, following precedent, allows one who has
been once before in jeopardy with respect to a criminal offense
to secure an original writ of prohibition in the supreme court to
prevent a threatened second trial for the same offense. 51 Another
1962 case deals, in an oblique way, with another possible pre-trial
remedy-that of the declaratory judgment to determine the validity
of a criminal statute or penal ordinance.5 2  The Colorado law is
47 See Scott, One Year Review of Crimina! Law and Procedure, 39 DICTA 81, 88 (1962), for a list
of innovations in Colorado criminal procedure made by the Rules.
48 Colorado Legislative Council, Colorado Criminal Low, 148-56 (Research Public. No. 68, Dec.
1962).
49 Colo. R. Crim. P. 44 (1961), as it read before the amendment, required such an appointment
in felony cases, but was silent as to misdemeanor cases.
50 Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (1961), as originally adopted, provided for review on error, on
behalf of the prosecution, of the sentencing court's grant of the motion for post-conviction relief.
51 Menton v. Johns, 377 P.2d 104 (Colo. 1962), following Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 128,
330 P.2d 539, 75 A.L.R.2d 628 (1958).
52 Bunzel v. City of Golden, 372 P.2d 161 (Colo. 1962), involved the use of the declaratory
judgment device to question the validity of a municipal ordinance. The supreme court assumed the
device to be proper but held the ordinance to be valid. The case does not make it clear, however,
whether the ordinance in question is a penal ordinance, with criminal penalties authorized for
violations.
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not at all clear as to whether this remedy is available for such a
purpose.
5 3
C. Arrest Without Warrant
One 1962 criminal defendant claimed on writ of error that his
arrest without a warrant for robbery was illegal, because the police
officer who arrested him used "hearsay" evidence to determine
reasonable cause. The supreme court properly held 54  that the
policeman's reasonable cause to believe that a robbery had been
committed by the defendant may be based upon what others have
told him,55 pointing out incidentally that "hearsay" is not the
proper word for information so derived.
D. Bail
The Colorado constitution provides for bail in criminal cases
except for capital offenses "where the proof is evident or the
presumption great. '5 6 In other jurisdictions with similar consti-
tutional provisions there is a split of authority as to whether, in
a capital case, a defendant seeking bail has the burden of proving
that the evidence of his guilt is weak, or whether the prosecution
has the burden of proving that it is strong.5 7 In a 1962 Colorado
case the defendant, charged with murder, had been admitted to
bail pending his trial, and was eventually acquitted by the trial
judge's (erroneous) directed verdict of acquittal. 5s The supreme
court, commenting on the bail aspects of the case, stated that, in
view of the bailed person's temptation to abscond in a capital
case, courts should "proceed with extreme caution . . . in the
determination of whether the proof is evident or the presumption
great."59 Perhaps this is but another way of expressing the view
of some other jurisdictions that the burden of showing that the
evidence is weak rests upon the defendant.
E. Jury List
A criminal defendant charged with a felony in Colorado is by
statute entitled, before arraignment, to be furnished a list of
jurors on the jury panel.60 In a 1962 case the prosecution failed to
provide the defendant with the list, but as he neither objected to
going to trial without it, nor could show how he was prejudiced by
the lack of it, the failure did not constitute reversible error.61
By a sensible amendment to the Colorado Rules of Criminal
Procedure,2 the jury list is to be furnised at the time of the pre-
at A 1960 case, Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery, 144 Cola. 448, 356 P.2d 884 (1960), discussed
at 38 DICTA 65, 71 (1961), held the declaratory judgment to be a proper device to determine in
advance the validity of a criminal statute. In 1961, Meier v. Schooley, 147 Colo. 244, 363 P.2d
653 (1961), without referring to the 1960 case, held that the declaratory judgment cannot be used
for such a purpose. The 1962 Bunzel case seems to go back to the 1960 view.
54 Brown v. People, 375 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1962) (victim of robbery identified defendant's picture
as the picture of the one who had robbed him). Accord, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959). Of course, even an illegal pretrial arrest cannot be the ground for reversal of a conviction
obtained at a proper trial, the pretrial wrong being of no importance at this point. The legality
of the arrest will be of great importance in the future, however, with respect to the admissibility
of evidence searched for and seized without a search warrant, when the search was made incident
to the arrest.
55 Information from an informr whose past information has proved reliable constitutes probable
cause, though the officer does not know his identity. People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal.2d 330, 341 P.2d 1
(1959).
56 Colo. Const. art. II, § 19.
57 Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, 108 (1947).
58 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
59 Id. at 430.
60 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-3-6 (1953).
61 Goldsberry v. People, 369 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1962).
62 Colo. R. Crim. P. 10(f) (1963 amend.).
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paration of the list of jurors who will form the panel for the
defendant's case, rather than furnished at some time before arraign-
ment when the jurors on the list will generally not be the jurors
who will try the case.
F. Information
An information charging burglary is not improperly worded if
it states that the defendant feloniously and without force entered
"the room of Leo Beaubien at the Harvard Hotel, viz., room 204,"
with intent to commit larceny therein, even though Leo was a
one-night guest at the hotel and not the owner or even a perma-
nent resident of the building.
6'
An old Colorado statute, and a new Colorado Rule,6 4 provides
for indorsement of prosecution witnesses upon the information at
the time of filing it, with a provision that the names of witnesses
not so indorsed, whose identities are not learned by the prosecuting
attorney until afterwards, may be later indorsed and the witnesses
called to testify at the trial. A 1962 case concerned the trial court's
granting of a motion by the prosecution to indorse two new names.
The defendant objected to the motion, but, as he did not ask for a
continuance on account of surprise, the supreme court held that
the trial court did not commit reversible error in allowing the
indorsement on the day of the trial.6 5
63 Gallegos v. People, 370 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1962).
64 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-4-1, -2 (1953); Colo. R. Crim. P. 7(b)(1) (1961).
65 Goldsberry v. People, supro, note 61.
WHERE DENVER SHOPS WITH CONFIDENCE .
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G. Plea
Whether a Colorado defendant, once he has pleaded guilty to a
criminal charge, may thereafter, before he is sentenced, be allowed
to change his plea to not guilty is said to be a matter lying within
the sound discretion of the trial court.66 In this case the defendant,
charged with burglary, pleaded guilty when unrepresented by
counsel, persisting therein after having been warned by the court
of the consequences of his guilty plea.6 7 Before the time set for
sentence he acquired counsel, 68 who, after advising the defendant
to change his plea to not guilty, moved the court for permission to
withdraw the guilty plea. It would seem that, in the case of a
guilty plea made without counsel, if counsel later, but before
sentencing, undertakes to represent the defendant and, after study,
believes that the defendant has a chance of success on a not-guilty
plea, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to grant a change of
plea upon motion made before sentencing. rn any event, it is
hard to reconcile the holding of the case with the magnanimous
statement of the Colorado Supreme Court on other occasions to
the effect that the discretion to allow a change of plea "should be
exercised liberally in favor of life and liberty."69
H. Pre-Trial Discovery
Pre-trial discovery in criminal cases, to a limited extent, arrived
in Colorado with the adoption in 1961 of the new Rules of Criminal
Procedure. One Colorado trial judge in 1962 invented a novel type
of pre-trial discovery device when he ordered that the prosecution
witnesses talk to the defendant's attorney on pain of being dis-
qualified as witnesses if they should refuse. The supreme court,
however, threw cold water on this new method of forcing prosecu-
tion witnesses to talk to the defense attorney, holding that the
trial court has no power to disqualify witnesses for such a reason.70
Doubtless, however, the trial court could properly order the district
attorney not to interfere with the defense attorney's attempts to
interview government witnesses, holding the threat of contempt
over the district attorney's head to enforce obedience to the order.
I. Voir Dire
In two 1962 cases the defendant, after his conviction, argued
on writ of error that events which occurred at the voir dire neces-
sitated a new trial. In one case a prospective juror, in answer to
a question asked by the attorney for a co-defendant, stated that
she was a "little prejudiced" against people of Spanish-American
ancestry because several boys of that type had broken some win-
dows at her church.
71
Upon challenge for cause, she was excused. The defendant's mo-
tion for a mistrial, on the ground that the juror's statement had poi-
soned the minds of the other prospective jurors, was denied; and the
66 Hudspeth v. People, 375 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1962) (trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
change plea upheld).
67 However, he did consult with his co-defendant's counsel after the prosecution presented evidence
in aggravation. After this consultation defendant said he had nothing to say as to why judgment
and sentence should not be pronounced.
68 The acquisition of counsel appears in the record of the case but not in the report.
69 See Gearhart v. People, 113 Colo. 9, 11, 154 P.2d 47 (1944); Abshier v. People, 87 Colo. 507,
524, 289 Pac. 1081, 1088 (1930).
70 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
71 Cruz v. People, 368 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1962).
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supreme court held the denial to be proper, since her quiet state-
ment was by no means an emotional outburst of an inflammatory
nature. In the other case, the defendant challenged for cause all
prospective jurors who had stated on voir dire that they would
regard the defendant's failure to take the witness stand as some
evidence of guilt.7 ' The trial court then told the jurors in strong
language that the law required that they must not so regard the
defendant's failure and asked them if they would follow the law
in this matter. On their assurance that they would, the court
denied the challenge, and the supreme court upheld its action.
J. "Exclusion Rule"
The trial court often orders that the witnesses in a criminal
case stay out of the courtroom during the trial except when testi-
fying, the purpose of this "exclusion rule" being to prevent the
witnesses from taking their cues from one another. In the Cruz
case, 73 the trial court made such an order, adding that the witnesses
should not talk to each other but might talk to the district attor-
ney's office. Thereafter, the district attorney interviewed several
witnesses in a group at one conference. The defendant, on learning
of this, moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The
supreme court affirmed the defendant's conviction, saying that
the particular exclusion order did not expressly forbid such an
interview and that, in any event, a mistrial is not the proper
remedy for a violation of the exclusion rule. The court stated
that an intentional violation of the exclusion rule might lead the
trial court to disqualify the offending witness, although even here
the court has discretion whether or not to impose this penalty.
A second 1962 case concerning the exclusion rule points out
that the trial court, after putting witnesses under the rule, has
discretion to permit a witness (here a police officer) to remain in




An informaion charged that the defendant robbed the victim of
his money and his watch. The prosecution's proof at the trial was
that the defendant robbed the victim of his watch, but there was
no proof as to the money. The defendant's claim that this consti-
tuted a fatal variance was properly rejected by the supreme court,
which pointed out that in robbery the kind of property taken
and its value are immaterial.
75
L. Insanity Trial
Colorado legislation provides for the alternative of two separate
trials or one single trial, in the trial court's discretion, whenever a
defendant has pleaded both "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason
of insanity. '7 6 The supreme court has explained the reason for
72 Goldsberry v. People, supra, note 61.
73 Supra, note 71.
74 Edwards v. People, 377 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1962).
75 Sterling v. People, 376 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1962).
76 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-3 (Supp. 1960). Though this statute as amended in 1955 is not clearly
worded, apparently the trial court has discretion, in the case of separate trials, as to whether to
have the same or a different jury try the two separate issues. A different jury is the more usual
procedure. E.g., Trujillo v. People, 372 P.2d 86 (Colo. 1962); Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322
P.2d 674 (1958).
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allowing separate trials before separate juries.7 7 Since, on the
issue of insanity, a much wider inquiry into the defendant's
behavior (including his other crimes and other misconduct) is
permitted than is allowable on the issue of guilt, a separate trial
before a separate jury protects the defendant from prejudice on
the issue of guilt, which might arise in the minds of a jury trying
both issues.
M. Miscellaneous Minor Matters at the Trial
1. Unauthorized Communications.-One 1962 case involved a
brief out-of-court communication between a juror and the manager
of the store which defendant was charged with burglarizing.78 Dur-
ing a recess in the trial, the manager was seen talking to the juror.
This was reported to the trial judge, who, after calling the juror
in t o chambers to find out what was said, learned that the two had
not discussed the case in any way. The trial judge's refusal to take
further action (such as granting a mistrial) was upheld by the su-
preme court, on the ground that the defendant showed no prejudice
resulting from the unauthorized communication.
2. Defendant in Handcuffs.-It is wrong to exhibit a defendant
to the jury in handcuffs or legs irons, or dressed in a striped suit
with "County Jail" written across the back.7 9 But where one juror
by accident saw the defendant in handcuffs as he was being brought
to the court house for the trial, the defendant's motion for a mis-
trial was denied. The supreme court properly upheld the denial of
the motion.80
3. Closing Argument.-In one case, the district attorney, in his
closing argument, inadvertently referred to the defendant's other
crimes (i.e., crimes for which he was not on trial), properly in evi-
dence, as "other offenses" rather than using the preferable term
"o'her transactions."' The defendant's motion for a mistrial was
held to have been properly denied in view of the trial court's
prompt admonition to the jury to disregard the use of "offenses"
because the defendant had not been charged with or proved guilty
of the other transactions in question. In another case, the supreme
court spoke of the trial court's broad discretion as to the scope of
the district attorney's (and defense attorney's) comment upon the
evidence and the legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom.
2
Counsel may not misstate the facts in evidence, but he has a good
deal of freedom in the inferences he urges the jury to draw from
the facts.
N. Motion to Elect Between Counts
In a 1962 case the defendant, who had been arrested with stolen
property in his possession, had received it from the thief either (1)
knowing, at the time he received it, that it had been stolen or (2)
not knowing it then but later, after learning of it, converting it to
77 Trujillo v. People, 372 P.2d 86 (Colo. 1962).
78 Torres v. People, 369 P.2d 80 (Colo. 19621, (the manager spoke to the juror these mysterious
words: "It's amazing how they can do some of it," to which the juror replied, "Yes, it is.").
79 Montoya v. People, 141 Colo. 9, 345 P.2d 1062 (1959) (handcuffs; recognizing the possibility
of the necessity of handcuffs for dangerous defendants); Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 174 P.2d
717 (1946) (striped clothing marked 'County Jail").
90 Ruark v. People, 372 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1962).
81 Peters v. People, 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962).
82 Bizup v. People, 371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962).
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his own use."3 Under the former alternative, his crime was receiving
stolen property; under the latter, larceny by bailee. The district at-
torney, not being able to show exactly what was in the defendant's
mind at the moment he received the property, prepared an informa-
tion charging the defendant in the alternative in two counts. After
the prosecution's evidence was in, the defendant moved to make the
district attorney elect one of the two counts to submit to the jury.
The trial court denied the motion, and the case was submitted to
the jury with instructions to convict on only one count according
to its findings of fact concerning the defendant's mental state when
he received the property. The supreme court a f firm ed the
defendant's conviction of larceny by bailee, holding that, with
evidence both ways the trial court properly refused to require
the prosecution to elect between the two counts.
0. Evidence
A number of Colorado criminal cases decided in 1962 necessarily
involved problems of evidence, but, since matters of evidence will
be treated in a separate article, only a few cases which relate parti-
cularly to criminal law are specifically discussed herein.
1. Burden of Proof.-The Colorado legislation on murder con-
tains a provisions4 that once the prosecution has proved the defend-
ant killed the victim, s the defendant has the burden of proving
circumstances which mitigate the homicide to voluntary manslaugh-
ter (i.e., proof that the killing was in a heat of passion induced by
an adequate provocation) or which reduce it all the way down to no
crime (e.g., proof that the killing was in proper self-defense). The
supreme court in 1962 held that this statute places upon the de-
fendant whose defense is self-defense the burden of going forward
with some evidence of self-defense, but that, once he has done so,
the burden of persuasion still remains with the prosecution, and
that the measure of its persuasion is still proof beyond reasonable
doubt.86 This is the way it should be as to any matter which con-
cerns the issue of guilt or innocence. 
7
2. Confessions.-If one (named A) of two confederates con-
fesses to a crime implicating the other (B), and B was not present
when A confessed and never thereafter assented thereto, the con-
fession is not admissible in evidence against B because, as to him,
it is plain hearsay.8 - In a 1962 felony-murder case the prosecution's
theory in the prosecution of B was that B, an adult, was the acces-
sory before the fact who procured A, a 15-year-old boy, to rob and
kill the victim.st The trial court admitted A's confession, with all
83 Peters v. People, Supra, note 81.
84 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-20 (1953).
85 Although the statute is not clearly worded ("The killing being proved"), this probably
requires proof that the defendant intentionally killed the victim (which intention may be inferred
from his intentional use of a deadly weapon upon the victim).
86 Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1962).
87 The some thing applies to the issue of insanity as a defense. In the first instance the prosecution
need not prove sanity, but once the defendant puts in some evidence of insanity, the prosecution
has the burden of persuasion of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Shank v. People, 79 Colo. 576,
247 Pac. 559 (1926). Compare the situation where the defendant's defense is procedural, such as
the statute of limitations. Here, if there is a dispute of fact (e.g., whether the defendant
in fact fled from justice so as to toll the statute), the law might properly put the burden of
persuasion (by a preponderance) upon the defendant. This issue is not concerned with guilt or
innocence, for the statute of limitations, if applicable, does not negative guilt.
S8 If A and B are tried together and A's confession introduced into evidence, this means that
the reference in A's confession to B must be deleted, or that the jury be instructed to consider
the confession as to A's guilt but not B's.
S9 Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1962).
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its references to B's conduct in procuring A, on the theory that, to
convict B as an accessory, it was necessary first to prove that his
agent A actually did the robbing and killing. The supreme court
reversed B's conviction of murder for the trial court's error in al-
lowing A's full confession. It was proper to use it at B's trial to show
A's conduct as the principal, but all references to B's conduct as an
accessory must be deleted.
The same case involved another interesting confession problem.
Upon the arrest of the defendant, the prosecution employed a psy-
chiatrist to make a mental examination of the defendant in jail-
just in case the defendant should later plead not guilty by reason
of insanity.1 0 (He did not so plead, as it turned out). During the
doctor's mental examination, the defendant orally confessed to the
crime in question and at the defendant's trial the doctor testified
to the defendant's confession, but (there being no issue as to in-
sanity) not as to the defendant's mental condition. The supreme
court reversed the conviction, holding that, aithough it might have
been proper for the doctor to make the mental examination, it was
reversible error to allow him to testify as to the confession he heard
during the examination. This result is doubtless required by the
special Colorado statute on procedure in insanity cases.91 In other
jurisdictions, however, the defendant's confession made to a psy-
chiatrist may be admissible unless the psychiatrist has "coerced"
the defendant into giving it.92
There were two other 1962 confession cases. In one it was held
that the Colorado procedure by which the trial court determined
the admissibility of a confession by hearing evidence, in the jury's
presence, of its accuracy is not error because of what the jury
heard, even though the trial court, finding the confession to be in-
accurately transcribed, refused to allow it in evidence.9 3 The jury
did not hear the wording of the excluded confession, although they
may have received the impression, from what they did hear, that
90 A procedure held legal in Early v. People, 142 Colo. 462, 352 P.2d 112 (1960), noted at
38 DICTA 78-79 (19611.
91 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-2 (1953 (in o mental examination of a defendant, who has pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity, made by psychiatrists of one of two state hospitals or by a
commission of psychiatrists appointed by the court, "no substantive evidence acquired directly
or indirectly for the first time as the result of such observation and examination shall be
admissible on the issue of guilt of the crime charged .. .. ) If this is the rule as to the regular
type of examination after plea, it should not be circumvented by the irregular type of examination
in jail before plea.
92 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954), involved the state prosecution's use of a psychiatrist,
not to make a mental examination, but to get a confession. By pretending to be trying to help
the defendant, the psychiatrist got the defendant to confess - a confession overheard by the
police who were eavesdropping. The confession was held to be coerced, and its use by a state
in evidence held to violate fourteenth amendment due process.
93 Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962).
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the defendant had made damaging admissions. In still another con-
fession case, the court held that when the defendant's voluntary
confession is admissible, it may be received in all its parts including
the defendant's reference therein to other misconduct (here, his acts
of fornication, unrelated to the crime charged)."
In 1962 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Colorado
murder conviction of a 14-year-old boy because it found that his
confession, used in evidence against him at his trial, had been co-
erced by methods condemned by the due process clause of the United
States Constitution's fourteenth amendment. 5 The boy had orally
and voluntarily confessed immediately upon his arrest, and five
days later he signed a formal written confession. This latter con-
fession was obtained before the boy had been brought before the
juvenile judge and after he had been held in Juvenile Hall for five
days without seeing a lawyer, parent or other friendly adult, al-
though his mother had made one attempt to see him. On the other
hand, the boy was not threatened or beaten or subjected to any sort
of relentless interrogation; he was not placed in solitary confine-
ment; and he was told he did not have to make a statement and that
he could have an attorney and his parents present. The Court held
(in a 4-to-3 decision) that, on the above uncontroverted evidence
concerning the events surrounding the written confession, the writ-
ten confession was coerced; and that the conviction must be re-
versed even though, at the trial, the defendant's uncoerced oral con-
fession, together with other evidence, a d e q u a t e 1 y proved the
defendant's guilt. No doubt the defendant's extreme youth was
important to the majority's determination of coercion, because,
except for that one factor, his treatment by the authorities does
not seem to have been coercive.
3. Disqualification of Witnesses.-One case96 suggests that the
trial court may, in its discretion, disqualify a witness who has in-
tentionally violated the courts exclusion rule; 97 another 98 that it
may not, as a method of enforcing a pre-trial discovery order (here
a novel one which orders the prosecution witnesses to discuss the
case with the defendant's attorney), disqualify a witness who fails
to obey the order.
4. Miscellaneous.-Cases involving evidence obtained by unrea-
sonable searches and seizures-which evidence, the United States
Supreme Court held in Mapp v. Ohio,"' a state must not use against
a s'ate criminal defendant-have as yet hardly begun to appear in
the Colorado Supreme Court reports.10 0 As usual, however, a num-
ber of 1962 cases dealt with the admissibility of evidence of the de-
fendant's other crimes.10 1 Other cases denied the relevance-in a
94 Torres v. People, 369 P.2d (Colo. 1962).
95 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), reversing Gallegos v. People, 145 Colo. 53,
358 P. 2d 1028 (1960), discussed briefly at 38 DICTA 65, 78 (1961).
96 Cruz v. People, 368 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1962).
97 See supro notes 73-74 and text.
98 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962), discussed supra at note 70 and text.
119 367 U.S. 643 (1961), noted at 39 DICTA 94 (1962).
100 Peters v. People, 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962), held a search (without a search warrant)
and seizure to be reasonable in view of the permission given (by whom is not stated) to the
police to make the search. The court did not need to decide upon the retroactivity of the case
of Mapp v. Ohio. For a recent federal case holding that the Mapp case applies retroactively and
can be taken advantage of, in a federal habeas corpus case, by a state convict who, before
Mapp, failed to object at the trial and failed to raise the point on his appeal, see Hall v. Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963).
101 Ruark v. People, 372 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1962); Peters v. People, 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962);
Jordan v. People, 376 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1962); Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962).
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homicide prosecution where the defendant's defense was self-de-
fense-of the victim's uncommunicated threats;1'0 2 refused to require
positive identification by eyewitnesses to a robbery, in view of other
evidence of guilt; 10 3 allowed a witness to read notes he had made
at the time of an event to which he is testifying, on the theory that
the notes are his "past recollection recorded," although the witness
did not first try to use the notes to refresh his present recollec-
tion; 10 4 upheld the admissibility, in a homicide case, of a photograph
of the deceased, though it brought vividly to the jurors' attention
the details of a shocking crime; 0 5 allowed evidence of flight as
showing consciousness of guilt, although the defendant, after the
crime, slept before fleeing; 106 and permitted a finding of guilt to
rest upon circumstantial evidence alone. 1 7 In a case where a con-
federate of the defendant, called by the prosecution to testify
against him, refused to testify on the ground of his privilege against
self-incrimination, the district attorney's act of calling the witness
was not misconduct, in view of the fact that he fully expected the
witness to give testimony.1 08
P. Instructions
Several 1962 cases dealt with the effect upon a criminal con-
viction of improper jury instructions. It is, of course, error for the
court to give an instruction on the law (even one which states the
law correctly) if there is no proof on which to base the instruc-
tion. 10 9 But is it reversible error to do so?
In one 1962 case the defendant was charged with murder, but
at the trial there was no proof of any homicide greater than man-
slaughter. 110 The court, over the defendant's objections, instructed
on murder as well as on manslaughter, and the jury found the de-
fendant guilty of manslaughter. It was argued on writ of error that,
although it was error to instruct on murder without any support in
the evidence, the defendant was not harmed thereby, because the
jury rejected the murder verdict and found him guilty of man-
slaughter, for which there was evidentiary support. The supreme
court reversed, however, on the theory that, since verdicts are often
compromises between possible choices, the murder possibility en-
hanced the chance of a manslaughter conviction. Thus the defend-
ant was in fact prejudiced by an instruction on a higher degree of
crime than the proof warranted."'
102 Truiillo v. People, 372 P.2d 86 (Colo. 1962) (Newly discovered evidence of threats not
grounds for a new trial).
103 Gurule v. People, 372 P.2d 88 (Colo. 1962). See also People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo.
1962) (Identification witness testified, "I am not sure but I think I recognize him," meaning the
defendant).
104 Jordan v. People, 376 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1962), following 3 Wigmore Evidence, §738 (3d ed. 1940).
(3d ed. 1940).
105 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427 (Colo. 1962).
106 Goldsberry v. People, 369 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1962).
107 Edwards v. People, 377 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1962).
108 Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962), distinguishing De Guesoldo v. People, 147
Colo. 462, 364 P.2d 374 (1961) (prosecution did not expect confederate to testify, but did
expect him to claim the privilege), noted at 39 DICTA 92 (1962).
109 Conversely, it is proper to refuse to give an instruction where there is no evidence on
which to base it. Sterling v. People, 376 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1962).
110 Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 53 (Colo. 1962).
111 It might similarly be argued that for the prosecution to qualify the jury for the death
penalty when there is no possibility of imposing capital punishment (or when the prosecution
does not intend to ask for it) is prejudicial error, for may not the jury be more likely to
compromise on conviction of a higher degree of homicide on account of the suggestion of
capital punishment?
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In another 1962 case, involving a prosecution for involuntary
manslaughter, there was proof that the defendant, driving his car,
hit and killed another person.' 1 2 There was some evidence that he
was driving with criminal negligence, but there was no evidence
that he was violating any speeding statute. The trial court in-
structed the jury to convict if it should find either (1) that he was
criminally negligent and that this negligence was the proximate
cause of the victim's death, or (2) that he was speeding in violation
of law and that speeding was the proximate cause of the victim's
death. The supreme court reversed the conviction of involuntary
manslaughter because of the giving of instructions (containing cor-
rect statements of law) not supported by evidence and because "the
jury might well have considered such instructions as an invitation
to proceed on the law without evidence"-i.e., to find that the de-
fendant was speeding when there was no evidence of that fact. This
error is more clearly a reversible one than the error in the case dis-
cussed in the next paragraph above. Here the jury found him guilty
of the crime instructed on (manslaughter) because they found that
he was speeding, but that he did not drive with criminal negligence;
whereas in the previous case the jury found that he did not commit
the crime on which instructions were given (murder).
One 1962 case points out that it is sometimes reversible error
to instruct the jury in the exact language of the statute-as where
the statute is so ambiguously worded as to tend to confuse the
jury.""x Here the statute in question provides that, once the prosecu-
tion has proved that the defendant killed the victim, "the burden
of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the
homicide, will devolve on the accused." The quoted portion has been
construed to mean that the defendant has the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence, but that he does not have the burden of
persuasion; 114 however, one could never in the world learn this from
simply reading the statute. This statute, then, must be more than
merely read to the jury; it must be explained.
Q. Verdict
1. Number of Crimes.-In one 1962 case the defendant, acting
in concert with a confederate, forged a check, and the confederate
unsuccessfully attempted to pass it."' The defendant was charged
with four separate crimes arising out of the one transaction: (1)
confidence game," 6 (2) conspiracy to commit confidence game, (3)
forgery, and (4) conspiracy to commit forgery. He was convicted
on all four counts and sentenced to a term of imprisonment on each
count (the report failing to state whether the sentences were to be
served consecutively or concurrently. The supreme court affirmed
the conviction without specifically discussing whether it was proper
to make four separate crimes out of what might seem to be but one.
It is quite well settled that one who agrees with another to commit
a crime and who then goes ahead and commits it may be convicted
of both the conspiracy and the substantive crime, and sentenced
112 Rumley v. People, 368 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1962).
113 Leonard v. People, 369 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1962).
114 Ibid., construing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-20 (1953).
115 Krontz v. People, 374 P.2d 199 (Colo. 1962).
116 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10-1 (1953) provides for a one to twenty year term of imprisonment
for one who obtains, or attempts to obtain, any money or property from another by means of a
confidence game.
1963
106 DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL VOL. XL
consecutively for each.117 It is not so clear, however, that one who
forges an instrument and later utters it can properly be convicted
of (and receive separate consecutive sentences for) both forgery
and confidence game. Under the Colorado statute,"" one who forges
a document and then utters it cannot be guilty of two separate acts
of forgery. The statute plainly says that one who utters a forged
instrument is guilty of forgery, so that uttering is simply one way
of committing forgery. 119 (On similar principles, one who has forci-
ble sexual relations with a sixteen-year-old mentally defective girl
is guilty of one rape, not three, though he has committed his one
rape in three different ways.) 120 If the legislature does not intend to
impose two forgery penalties upon one who first forges and then
utters, it is hard to believe that it could have intended a forgery
penalty plus a confidence game penalty for the same conduct.1'
2'
2. Consistency.-In a 1962 conspiracy case, four persons-A, B,
C and D - were tried together for an alleged conspiracy with one
another to steal.122 A, B and C were acquitted, but D was found
guilty. On writ of error the supreme court reversed the conviction
and ordered D's discharge, for the "incongruous conclusion" that D
conspired with A, B and C, although they did not conspire with
him.123 In another 1962 case the defendant was charged in two
counts with burglary and larceny, on the theory that he first en-
tered into another's hotel room with intent to steal and that he then
stole.124 The jury convicted him of the burglary, but it was not able
to agree upon the larceny; so the district attorney's motion to dis-
miss the larceny charge was granted. On writ of error the defendant
urged that the verdict of conviction of burglary was inconsistent
125
117 E.g. Callahan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). Contra: Model Penal Code, § 1.07(1)(b),
forbidding two convictions when 'one offense consists only of a conspiracy to commit the other."
118 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-6-1 (1953).
119 Davenport v. People, 138 Colo. 291, 332 P.2d 485 (1959) (evidence of uttering supports
conviction of forgery).
120 E.g., People v. Craig, 17 Cal.2d 453, 110 P.2d 403 (1951) (one act of forcible intercourse
with 16-year-old girl is one offense, not two).
121 In dealing with the counterpart situation with respect to federal crimes, the United States
Supreme Court has sometimes held that Congress did not mean to make two separate crimes
out of what is really one transaction. Thus, where the defendant entered a federally-insured
bank with intent to rob, and then robbed, he could not properly be convicted of both burglary
and robbery; the former merges into the latter. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
122 Archuleta v. People, 368 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1962).
123 Accord: Commonwealth v. Avrach, 110 Pa. Super. 438, 168 Atl. 531 (1933) (joint trial of A
and B, alleged conspirators; A convicted, B acquitted). Cf. People v. Levy, 299 III. App. 453, 20 N.E.
2d 171 (1939) (A tried in a separate trial for conspiracy with B and convicted; judgment reversed.
A to be held in custody or under bond, to be convicted if B is convicted, and to be acquitted if
B is acquitted, at B's later trial).
124 Gallegos v. People, 370 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1962).
125 As to the extent to which verdicts must be consistent, see 2 King, Colorado Practice
Methods, § 2377 (1956).
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with the acquittal of larceny, but the supreme court, affirming the
conviction, properly held that the verdicts were not in fact incon-
sistent. One may enter a place with intent to steal (and thus commit
burglary) and then, once inside, fail to commit larceny-perhaps
because he can find nothing worth stealing, or because he is fright-
ened away before he can lay hands on something worth taking, or
even because, overcome with remorse, he changes his mind about
stealing.
R. Motion for New Trial
A 1962 case states that a motion for a new trial on account of
newly discovered evidence is to be regarded with disfavor, and that
the trial court's discretion in acting on the motion is not (ordinarily,
at least) to be disturbed on writ of error by the supreme court r.1 2
It is true that there are fairly stringent rules about the kind of new
evidence which will warrant a new trial. The evidence must be
newly-discovered, not merely cumulative, not available at the trial,
and, if known then, might well have led to a different result. It
seems wrong, in view of these orthodox limitations, to add what
appears to be an invitation to trial courts to deny such a motion
even when the new evidence satisfies the requirements.
S. Sentence
1. Conviction on Two Counts.-One who has been convicted of
both burglary and conspiracy to commit that burglary may be sen-
tenced consecutively for each crime, 127 although often the trial court
in its discretion imposes concurrent sentences, as it may do when-
ever a defendant is convicted of two or more counts in a multiple-
count information. Where the trial court gave a single sentence
without designating which of two convictions the sentence applied
to, it was held not to be reversible error warranting a new trial or
a new sentence, so long as the sentence imposed did not exceed that
which could have been given for either of the two convictions.'
2 8
2. Collection of Fine.-A municipal ordinance provides for en-
forcing the collection of a fine imposed by the municipal court upon
a defendant, by throwing the defendant, who fails to pay it on de-
mand, into the city jail until he pays. The supreme court upheld the
district court's release of a defendant who had been thus confined
without the required demand having first been made upon him.'2
3. Service of Sentence.-In figuring the service of a sentence
of imprisonment, time spent by the prisoner on parole and while an
escapee does not count.1 3 Only a desperate prisoner, clutching at
straws, could argue otherwise.
4. Juvenile Delinquency Sentence.-The county court, in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding, was not authorized to sentence
the child to a term of imprisonment in the county jail .131 One may
wonder how the court could have thought the juvenile was going
to get, in the county jail, the care approximating that given by his
126 See Edwards v. People, 377 P.2d 399, 404 (Colo. 1962).
127 Supro, note 117.
12S Vigil v. People, 375 P.2d 103 (Colo. 1962).
129 Application of Montez, 370 P.2d 154 (Colo. 1962).
130 Furlow v. Tinsley, 377 P.2d 132 (Colo. 1962).
131 Martinez v. People, 372 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1962). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-8-1 (1953), before its
amendment in 1960, did provide for a possible county jail term for juvenile delinquents over 14.
The amendment deleted this provision.
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parents, or how he was going to be treated there as "misdirected
and misguided, and needing aid, encouragement, help and assist-
ance"1 32 unless it be a most unusual county jail.
T. Appeal from Municipal or Justice Court
Two 1962 cases concerned the right of a defendant, convicted of
municipal or county court, to appeal after having paid the fine
imposed upon him. The first case held that one who involuntarily
pays the fine imposed by the municipal court can still appeal to the
county (in Denver, the superior) court. 13  The second case held
that, even where the fine is paid voluntarily, the defendant (con-
victed in this case in justice court) may appeal.'1
4
The latter case also held that one is not precluded from
appealing by his failure to identify, in his notice of appeal, the
crime of which he was convicted. Although the statute on appeals
requires this identification, the supreme court, labeling the require-
ment highly technical, found that the appellant's failure to identify
the crime did not prejudice the prosecution, which knew exactly
what the offense was.
Another 1962 case allows one who has pleaded guilty in muni-
cipal court to appeal to the county (superior) court, where he will
get a trial de novo. 13 5 In an analogous situation, a Colorado sta-
tute very clearly gives this privilege to one who has pleaded
guilty in the justice of the peace court.13 6
U. Review on Writ of Error
1. Confession of Error.-In two cases the Attorney General
confessed error before the Colorado Supreme Court, in the tradi-
tion of the office of the Solicitor General of the United States
before the United States Supreme Court.
137
2. Reversible Error.-One case explained at some length that,
even when the guilt of the convicted defendant is indicated by
the record, serious trial errors of a prejudicial nature warrant a
remand for a new trial.138 The supreme court apparently believed
this defendant's guilt to be clearly shown by the record; but, so
as not to prejudice his chances for a fair trial on remand, it properly
expressed this notion in the more cautious language of "indicated"
guilt.
Another case held that one who is convicted of two crimes
when the proof shows he could have committed but one (as where
one is charged with embezzlement and larceny of the same prop-
erty at the same time and place, the district attorney not knowing
which of the two crimes the evidence will prove), a conviction of
132 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-8-13 (1953).
133 Pueblo v. Clemmer, 375 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1962). distinguishing Scott v. Denver, 125 Colo. 68,
241 P.2d 857 (1952) (no appeal if fine paid voluntarily).
134 Jackson v. People, 376 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1962), overruling Scott v. Denver, supro note 133.
135 Pueblo v. Trujillo, 374 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1962), following the weight of authority, see Annot.,
42 A.L.R.2d 995 (1955).
136 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 79-13-2 (Supp. 1960).
137 McCray v. People, 371 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1962) (confession that evidence does not support
verdict of conviction); Martinez v. People, 372 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1962) (confession that sentence
was to an improper place of confinement).
138 Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1962). On this principle the United States Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), on account
of the state's use of the defendant's coerced written confession, even though this confession
merely repeated the defendant's earlier voluntary oral confession, which was properly used in
evidence. If a serious error like the use of a coerced confession is mode, the United States.
Supreme Court will reverse, without considering whether the error is not prejudicial in view of
other strong evidence of guilt.
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both crimes is not reversible if the trial court sentences the defend-
ant concurrently, the sentence being less than the maximum which
could have been imposed for the lesser of the two crimes.
139
3. Verdict "Contrary to Law and Evidence."-It seems that
everyone who seeks review of his criminal case on writ of error
complains vaguely (in his motion for a new trial and in his brief;
and formerly in his assignments of error, now abolished) that the
verdict of guilt is "contrary to the law and the evidence." The
supreme court in 1962 reiterated an earlier statement that "Such a
general allegation is defective as to form, and such assignment
being improperly presented ordinarily need not be considered on
its merits.' 14 1 It seems clear that the defendant who complains
about the trial court's application of the law to his case should
point out the specific error-whether it be in its rulings on the
evidence, or in refusing to declare a mistrial, or in giving or refus-
ing instructions, or whatever it may be-of which he complains.
Where the complaint is about the evidence, he should specifically
claim that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a requested
judgment of acquittal, or in denying a motion for new trial because
the verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence, or
(under Rule 29(b) of the new Rules) in denying the defendant's
post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal in accordance with
his earlier motion for a judgment of acquittal, 141 as may be appro-
priate in the particular case.
4. Review by Certiorari.-Rule 106 (a) (4) of the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure allows a higher court to vacate the judgment
of an inferior court which has "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused
its discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy."
In one 1962 case, the supreme court, in an original proceeding in
that court, vacated the judgment of a district court which had
summarily found the district attorney in contempt and fined him
$25 for failing to be present or represented by his deputy when a
criminal case was called. 142 The supreme court found that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed summarily, for the
131) Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1962). Query, however, whether this should be so
if the two crimes carry different maximum penalties. It could be argued that the trial court might
have sentenced him more severely with the greater crime in mind, although the jury might have
acquitted him of that crime if it had done its duty and convicted him of one and acquitted him
of the other.
140 See Cruz v. People, 368 P.2d 774, 775 (Colo. 1962). The supreme court goes on to
consider whether the evidence supports the verdict.
141 Perhaps this post-verdict motion may be termed, a little loosely, a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or judgment n.o.v.-os the counterpart motion in civil procedure is
generally called.
142 District Attorney v. District Court, 371 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1962).
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contempt, if any, did not occur wholly in the court's presence. As
to the use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari 14 3 in lieu of
of the ordinary remedy of writ of error, it may be noted that the
supreme court apparently uses the word "jurisdiction" here in a
rather broad (if somewhat vague) sense; 144 and that it finds the
writ of error to be an inadequate remedy in a situation when it
ought to be adequate to do justice, especially when the situation
involves a mere monetary fine. 145 Perhaps the trouble lies in the
vague state of the Colorado procedural law in cases of criminal
contempt.146 The law ought to be that one fined for contempt can
pay his fine (to save himself from going to jail) and yet apply to
the supreme court for a review of the trial court's action in finding
him guilty of contempt.
V. Parole Violation
One 1962 case ordered the release of a parolee who had been
arrested for suspected parole violation and kept in confinement,
pending the parole department's investigation of the violation, for a
period longer than the fifteen-day period specified by the statute.
147
W. Former Jeopardy
In 1962, two cases before the Colorado Supreme Court involved
the question of whether the state constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy f o r b i d s the retrial of a criminal defendant
acquitted by a directed verdict of the trial court, which erroneously
held that the prosecution's evidence, assuming it to be true, did
not prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.14 In
one, the trial court directed a verdict of acquittal of both murder
and manslaughter where the prosecution's p r o o f was that the
defendant shot the victim to death in cold blood, the reason for
this startling action being that the defendant did not know the
victim and so could not have acted with malice toward him.1 49 In
the other, the trial court directed a verdict of acquittal in a case
involving assault to rob and conspiracy to rob, on the erroneous
ground that the prosecution had not proved venue.'5" Later, the
trial court, recognizing its mistake, ordered a new trial. In each
case, does a retrial constitute double jeopardy?
This is doubtless the way most American jurisdictions would
interpret their double-jeopardy provisions; 15 1 but it is arguable





the remedy of that former name.
144 See also Tolland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961), noted at 39 DICTA 99 (1962) (trial
court tried defendant too hastily and so "exceeded its jurisdiction").
145 Cf. Douglas v. Municipal Court, 377 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1963) (writ of prohibition to
prohibit prosecution in municipal court for violation of penal ordinance denied, in view of
adequate remedy of defending at jury trial, followed by review on writ of error).
146 The original rules proposed by the Colorado Bar Association Committee contained Rule
42 on procedure in criminal contempt cases, but the rule was deleted by the Colorado Supreme
Court in adopting the Rules in 1961.
147 Schooley v. Wilson, 374 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1962), applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-17-6 (1953),
as amended by Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 104.
148 Colo. Const. art. II, §18 " . . . nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. If the jury disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after the verdict, or if the
judgment be reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in
jeopardy."
149 People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d (Colo. 1962). See supra notes 10-12 and text for a discussion
of this erroneous ruling.
150 Menton v. Johns, 377 P.2d 104 (Colo. 1962).
151 E.g., Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). Confro: State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30
AtI. 1110 (1894). The Connecticut view does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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that, under Colorado's unusual provision, a retrial, after an erro-
neous acquittal not on the merits, does not constitute double
jeopardy. Colorado provides that "if the judgment be reversed for
error in law" the defendant is not deemed to have been in jeopardy;
and this literally is broad enough to include the reversal of an
erroneous acquittal (as well as the reversal of an erroneous con-
viction) on account of the trial court's error of law. As to whether
a retrial should be permitted on principle, I am impressed by this
recent statement concerning trial court errors: "In the criminal
area, it is hard to say whether more harm is done by unjust con-
victions or unjust acquittals. Perhaps the latter, for an appellate
court can weed out the unjust convictions, and there is a fair to
good chance that it actually will do so."' 
5 2
In another 1962 case, the defendant, convicted of larceny from
the person (a felony, with a maximum penalty of ten years in the
penitentiary) was erroneously sentenced by the trial court to six
months in the county jail (a misdemeanor sentence).'11 The pro-
secution appealed, and the supreme court naturally held the sen-
tence to be erroneous. But the supreme court "disapproved" of
the sentence instead of remanding for a new sentence. Does double
jeopardy forbid a correct resentence here? Surely, it does not154
even if the net result may be the imposition of a more severe
sentence,' of course, time served under the old sentence should
be counted as service under the new one.
15 6
X. Postconviction Remedies
1. Habeas Corpus.-The habeas corpus remedy is available
only to persons in custody. Very likely one who has been convicted,
served part of his sentence and been paroled is in "constructive"
custody for habeas corpus purposes, so long as he is under the super-
vision of the parole department.
1 57
In 1958, the Colorado Supreme Court disapproved of the trial
court's practice of appointing counsel for an indigent convict seek-
ing habeas corpus relief, on the ground that habeas corpus is a
civil, not a criminal, remedy.15 8 In a recent federal case involving
a petition for federal habeas corpus brought by a Colorado convict
having difficulty, without the aid of counsel, in exhausting his
Colorado remedies, the federal district judge expressed his concern
over this Colorado policy, calling it a "sad commentary" on Colo-
rado's judicial system. 15 1" It may be noted, however, that the new
remedy created by Colorado Rule 35 (b) provides for postconvic-
tion relief on behalf of convicted defendants under certain circum-
152 Bishop, Book Review, 72 Yale L. J. 618, 622 (1963).
1.53 People v. McIntosh, 369 P.2d 987 (Colo. 1962).
154 Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(a) (1961) authorizes a trial court to correct an illegal sentence
at any time. A misdemeanor sentence for a felony conviction is surely an "illegal" sentence
within the meaning of the Rule, just as a felony sentence for a misdemeanor conviction would be.
155 Cf. United States v. Howell, 103 F.Supp. 714 (D.W.Va. 1952), aff'd 199 F.2d 366 (4th
Cir. 1952) (a sentence declared void because of absence of defendant's counsel when
sentence pronounced may be increased on resenten:e, the void sentence being nonexistent).
156Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c) (1961), as amended in 1963, see supra notes 49-50 and text thereto,
specifically so provides.
157 See Schooley v. Wilson, 374 P.2d 353, 354 (Colo. 1962) (the parolee having been jailed
for investigation of suspected parole violation held to be in actual custody and so eligible for
habeas corpus relief).
158 McGrath v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 18, 328 P.2d 579 (1958).
159 Pigg v. Tinsley, (D. Colo. 1963) (unreported). See Rocky Mt. News, Jan. 22, 1963.
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stances, 160 and this is a criminal, not a civil, remedy, for which
a trial court probably may, though it need not, appoint counsel.
2. Remedy under Rule 35(b).-The first case utilizing this new
remedy reached the supreme court in 1962.161 The defendant's post-
conviction motion to vacate his sentence for burglary stated, among
other things, that his guilty plea had been obtained by threats to
arrest and prosecute his sister unless he admitted participation in
the burglary. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing
as to the truth of the allegations of coercion. The wrong complained
of, the court said, was not the type of wrong remediable by Rule
35 (b), since the normal remedy of writ of error had been available
to correct the wrong if the defendant was thus coerced into pleading
guilty. The supreme court merely stated that the trial court "cor-
rectly" denied the motion.
While it is true that the writ of error is an adequate remedy to
right many constitutional wrongs, it is not adequate if the wrong
does not appear on the record so as to be reviewable on error.
And the fact that a guilty plea is coerced would naturally not
appear in the record.'6 -2  Rule 35 (b) expressly provides for relief
in the case of a violation of constitutional rights "of a sort not
effectively subject to review on writ of error . . . because the
violation through no fault of the prisoner did not appear upon the
record so as to be subject to review." Thus the trial court should
have held a hearing as to the truth of the allegations of coercion
of the guilty plea.
163
Y. Extradition
Two 1962 cases concerned the extradition, from Colorado to an-
other state, of a fugitive from the other state who had fled to Colo-
rado. In each case the other state's governor had made demand upon
the Colorado governor for the extradition of the fugitive, who had
160See Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (1961). This Rule contains nothing about the appointment of
counsel. Rule 44 provides for appointment of counsel to represent the indigent defendant in a
felony case "at every stoge of the trial court proceedings." Perhaps this does not cover the
postconviction phase in the trial court, but that does not mean the trial court may not appoint
counsel if it believes justice requires it. The federal courts often appoint counsel for indigent
federal or state prisoners seeking postconviction relief in the federal courts. E.g., Dillon v.
United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) (federal prisoner); United States ex rel. Wissonfeld
v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960) (state prisoner).
161 Hudspeth v. People, 375 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1962).
162 Thus in Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), postconviction habeas corpus was allowed for
the allegation that federal police coerced a guilty plea from a federal criminal defendant.
163 See Symposium on the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, 35 Rocky Mt. L.. Rev. 70-71
(1961)
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then been arrested on the Colorado governor's warrant and lodged
in a Colorado jail. In one case, the district court on its own motion
dismissed the extradition proceeding, because no agent from that
state had come to Colorado for the fugitive within sixty days after
his Colorado arrest.1 64 The supreme court disapproved of this action
by the trial court, stating that the proper procedure is for the
fugitive to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to be followed
by a courtroom hearing after notice to the proper Colorado and
foreign officials. 1 65 In the other case, the fugitive filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus alleging certain defects in the extra-
dition proceeding. 6 6 The court granted the petition, ordering the
sheriff (who had custody of the fugitive) to show cause why he
properly detained the fugitive. A hearing was held at which the
sheriff showed, by presenting the extradition papers, that the extra-
dition proceeding was valid. The court thereupon discharged the
writ. On error, the fugitive argued that since the sheriff never
filed a formal written return to the writ before the hearing, the
hearing was defective. The supreme court rejected his contention,
properly placing substance ahead of form.
Z. Criminal Contempt
Two 1962 cases dealt with criminal contempt. In one the
district attorney was not present, either personally or by his official
representative, when a criminal case on the docket was called for
trial.167 This absence caused considerable inconvenience and delay
in the transaction of the court's business. When the district attor-
ney next appeared in court, the court summarily held him in con-
tempt, imposing a $25 fine. On review by the supreme court, the
judgment of contempt was vacated. It may well be criminal con-
tempt for a district attorney "wilfully or intentionally 1 68 to be
absent when a case is called, thus causing inconvenience and delay;
but if so, it is not a direct contempt committed entirely in the
court's presence. The mental element (wilfulness or intention)
cannot be known by the court through personal observation in
the courtroom-unlike the case of the disappointed litigant or his
lawyer who throws a brickbat at, or who makes known his dis-
pleasure by using abusive language toward, the judge as he sits
on the bench. Indirect contempts are not punishable summarily.
Although, in the case of indirect contempt, there need not be an
information followed by trial by jury, there must at least be notice
to the alleged contemnor (if he is not in court, notice is generally
in the form of a rule to show cause why he should not be adjudged
in contempt for the alleged specific misconduct), followed by a
hearing at which he is entitled to defend himself, before the court
can adjudge him in contempt.
164 Krutko v. Bryer, 372 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1962).
165 Query, however, whether the delay of sixty days in coming for the accused by representa-
tives of the demanding state is a proper ground for dismissing the proceeding on a writ of habeas
corpus, since the statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 60.1-10 (1953), provides that a petition for habeas
corpus by the fugitive is the proper way to "test the legality of his arrest." Delay after arrest
con hardly affect the legality of the arrest itself.
166 Bright v. Foster, 374 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1962).
167 District Attorney v. District Court, 371 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1962).
168 Query what "wilfully" means. Perhaps it means "recklessly" - i.e., the district attorney
realizes that there is a great risk of delay and inconvenience though he does not know for sure
that this will happen and does not desire it.
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In the other case, the supreme court said that a lawyer who, in
violation of the trial court's rules, showed up for the pretrial con-
ference in a civil case totally unprepared might perhaps be guilty
of a direct criminal contempt p u n i s h a b 1 e summarily. 16t The
supreme court held, however, that the following irregular pro-
cedure by the trial court in handling the matter was improper.
The trial court, three days after the attending lawyer's misconduct,
entered an order retroactive to the day of the misconduct ordering
that the lawyer pay $150 "expenses" to the lawyer for the other
side, who had been inconvenienced by the offending lawyer's
unpreparedness. The trial court did not, in fact, think to call the
matter a contempt for another month, when for the first time it
spoke of it as a disciplinary matter.170
AA. Juvenile Delinquency
A juvenile delinquency proceeding is defective, and a determi-
nation of delinquency must be reversed, if the statutory require-
ment of notice to the juvenile's parents or guardian, giving the
date and hour of the hearing, is not fulfilled. 17 1
BB. Statutory Changes
The 1962 legislature made two minor amendments to existing
Colorado criminal procedure.
1. Statute of Limitations.-Existing Colorado law exempts,
from the ordinary three-year statute of limitations 172 on prosecu-
tions for felonies, the crimes of murder, forgery and kidnapping,
for which trio of crimes there is no time limitation at all. In 1962
another exception was provided for: in the case of felonies (other
than the select three) committed by a public official in connection
with the duties of his office, the official must be prosecuted within
three years after the termination of his employment, or within six
years after the commission of his crime, whichever first occurs.
1 7
3
2. Insanity Procedure.-Existing Colorado law allows the trial
court to order the mental examination of a defendant who has
pleaded insanity at the time of the alleged crime (or who claims
later to have become insane), to be conducted by a commission
of one to three psychiatrists. The law before 1962 required that
these psychiatrists live or have an office within thirty miles of
the town where the case is pending; but a 1962 amendment elimi-
nates the thirty-mile requirement, 174 no doubt because in some areas
of Colorado there are simply no psychiatrists to be found within a
thirty-mile radius of the place of trial.
169 Pittman v. District Court, 369 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1962).
170 It is unfortunate that the Colorado Supreme Court, in adopting the Colorado Rules, did
not adopt proposed Rule 42 on criminal contempt based upon Fed. R. Crim. P. 42, which makes
quite plain the difference between direct and indirect criminal contempts and the different procedure
to be followed depending upon the type of contempt involved.
171 Martinez v. People, 372 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1962), based upon Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 22-8-1, 22-8-3
(Supp. 1960) (parents or guardian must be notified of the hearing and must show whether they
are able to correct the child or remove the cause of his delinquency).
172 That is, the indictment must be found, or the information filed, within three years afterthe felony is committed.
173 Colo. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 44, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-1-3 (1953). Why forgery
belongs in the select group of three felonies as to which there is no time limitation is something
of a mystery. For an argument favoring the amendment of the statute of limitations concerning
embezzlement, see 36 DICTA 42 (1959).
174 Colo. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 45 amending §§ 39-8-2(1), 39-8-6, as amended in 1961.
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